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THE CONTRACTUAL DUTY OF COMPETENT
REPRESENTATION
JAMES D. HOLZHAUER*
Unions have a duty to represent employees fairly, but it is not at all
clear that they have a duty to represent them well. If an employee files a
grievance against her employer, and the union fails to represent her ade-
quately because she's female, or because she's black, or because she sup-
ported the losing slate of candidates in the last union election, the union
has violated its duty of fair representation. That kind of intentional dif-
ferential treatment is unfair in both the statutory and the common-sense
meaning of the word unfair; the union has treated her differently than it
would treat other, similarly situated persons because of factors deemed
irrelevant or inappropriate such as race, gender or political activity. But
what if the union fails to represent the employee adequately because the
union grievance handler misplaced her form, or miscalculated and filed
the grievance too late? That may be incompetent and careless, but it is
not unfair in the same way that gender, racial or political discrimination
is unfair.
The federal courts have long had difficulty with the issue of whether
negligent or incompetent-but not intentionally discriminatory-han-
dling of employee grievances violates the duty of fair representation. The
Sixth and Ninth Circuits have held that a union's negligent failure to
process a grievance in a proper and timely manner may breach the duty
of fair representation without any showing of bad intent. The leading
proponent of the opposite view is the Seventh Circuit: it requires a show-
ing of intentional misconduct and has repeatedly declined to find a
breach of the duty even in cases of extreme carelessness. The Seventh
Circuit's approach-"the most rigid standard for establishing a breach of
the duty of fair representation" '-is open to criticism as leading to overly
harsh results.
It is extremely harsh when an employee unjustly loses her job and
fails to regain it because of the union's negligence. But that begs the
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essential question: should the duty of fair representation protect against
intentionally discriminatory or unfair treatment? In this article I argue
that the Seventh Circuit's approach to the statutory duty of fair represen-
tation is basically sound. That court is right when it holds that the duty
of fair representation as it has developed sets a standard for union fair-
ness, and not a standard for union competence. But that does not neces-
sarily mean that employees are entirely without remedies for union
incompetence or that, as the Seventh Circuit implies, their only remedy is
to kick out the union and replace it with a more careful and competent
one. The relationship between a union and the workers it represents is
both a statutory and a contractual one. The contractual part of the rela-
tionship may very well establish meaningful and enforceable obligations
of union care and competence, and when unions breach those contractual
obligations there is no persuasive reason why they cannot be called to
task before a federal or state court or another appropriate forum.
I. THE GRIEVANCE HANDLING PROCESS
Although it is certainly possible for a union to be negligent or in-
competent in other areas, most of the duty of fair representation cases
involving negligence or incompetence arise in the area of grievance han-
dling. Nearly all collective bargaining agreements between employers
and the unions representing their employees include a procedure for han-
dling employee grievances. Typically, the procedure gives an employee
one or more opportunities to present the grievance to management offi-
cials. If that does not resolve the matter, most agreements provide for
some sort of final and binding arbitration. The great majority of such
agreements provide that an employee on his own cannot invoke arbitra-
tion, "the most costly and time-consuming step in the grievance proce-
dure"; 2 that decision must be made by the union, which usually shares
the cost of arbitration with the employer and thus has a strong financial
incentive to avoid taking nonmeritorious cases to arbitration.
3
Unions do not take every asserted grievance to arbitration, and quite
naturally the care and effort a union takes in representing a grievant var-
ies considerably from case to case and from union to union. Some unions
hire lawyers to handle grievances; others use highly-skilled lay grievance
2. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191 (1967).
3. The union has other incentives to avoid taking nonmeritorious grievances to arbitration as
well. Pursuing nonmeritorious grievances can be destructive of the valuable working relationship
between union and company representatives. Employers may consider such conduct to be a form of
harassment, and the union will lose valuable credibility if it takes every case to arbitration (i.e.,
invoking arbitration will no longer be regarded as a sign of serious union concern).
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handlers who are full-time, paid employees or officers of the union; still
others rely on unpaid union officers-co-workers of the grievant who
have been elected to their union positions. Most unions make some sort
of subjective evaluation of the importance and merit of each case and
allocate their efforts and resources accordingly, expending considerable
resources on important and meritorious cases, applying somewhat less
effort on cases seen as less important or of lesser merit, and declining to
take nonmeritorious cases to arbitration at all. In discussing potential
arbitration cases with management representatives, union grievance han-
dlers may engage in "horse trading," agreeing to drop weak or unimpor-
tant cases in return for favorable settlement of stronger or more
important cases.
The union representative's evaluation of the importance and
strength of any particular grievance may not coincide fully with that of
the grievant, and conflicts may arise when the union drops a grievance or
devotes less effort to it than the grievant believes it deserves. In addition
to disagreements over the merits of grievances, disputes may arise over
the care and competence of the union's representation. Sometimes griev-
ance papers are lost; the competence and experience of some lay griev-
ance handlers and of some lawyers is limited; and the diligence of the
union's representation may depend upon whether the grievant is in the
union's good graces and on whether his cause is popular. Grievances
may be lost or dropped out of negligence, as a result of incompetence, or
because of hostility toward the grievant or his claim.
When an employee is unhappy with the outcome of his grievance,
his options are limited. Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act 4 authorizes employees to seek relief in court for violation of their
rights under a collective bargaining agreement,5 but those rights are de-
fined and limited by the collective bargaining agreement which creates
them, and in nearly all cases the agreement will provide that the exclu-
sive remedy is that which results from the operation of the grievance
procedure. An employee must exhaust the contractual remedies before
seeking relief in court, and in most cases the outcome of the contractual
process is final and binding, whether that outcome is determined by an
arbitrator's decision, by the decision of the union not to take a case to
arbitration, or by neglect, incompetence or procedural error making arbi-
4. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982).
5. Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962). Section 301 authorizes "[s]uits for
violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization ... or between any such labor




II. THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION IN THE SUPREME COURT
One of the few ways in which an employee may be able to avoid the
final and binding effect of the resolution reached through the grievance
procedure is by demonstrating that the union's handling of the matter
breached the duty of fair representation and thereby precluded the em-
ployee from exhausting the contractual remedy in a meaningful way.
The Supreme Court's initial application of the duty of fair representation
came in a case under the Railway Labor Act 7 involving a union's sub-
stantive position in contract negotiations rather than its role as grievance
handler.8 The Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Engineers,
which limited its membership to whites, was nevertheless (by operation
of the statute) the exclusive representative for a bargaining unit of Louis-
ville & Nashville Railroad firemen which included a substantial minority
contingent of black firemen. In 1940, the Brotherhood announced a de-
sire to amend its collective bargaining agreement with the Louisville &
Nashville and other railroads in a way that would ultimately exclude all
blacks from employment as firemen. 9 Early the next year, the railroads
agreed to new collective bargaining provisions limiting the employment
of black firemen. Steele, a black fireman, sued claiming that the union's
conduct violated his rights under the Railway Labor Act. The Supreme
Court, reversing a decision of the Supreme Court of Alabama, upheld
Steele's claim:
We think that the Railway Labor Act imposes upon the statutory
representative of a craft at least as exacting a duty to protect equally
the interests of the members of the craft as the Constitution imposes
upon a legislature to give equal protection to the interests of those for
whom it legislates. Congress has seen fit to clothe the bargaining rep-
resentative with powers comparable to those possessed by a legislative
body both to create and restrict the rights of those whom it represents,
but it has also imposed on the representative a corresponding duty.
We hold that [the Act] expresses the aim of Congress to impose on the
bargaining representative of a craft or class of employees the duty to
exercise fairly the power conferred upon it in behalf of all those for
whom it acts, without hostile discrimination against them. 10
6. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650
(1965).
7. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1982).
8. Steele v. Louisville & Nash. R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
9. The Brotherhood sought a rule limiting promotion to engineer to whites coupled with a rule
that only "promotable" workers should be employed as firemen. Id. at 195.
10. Id. at 202-03 (citations omitted).
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Eleven years later, the Court held that the National Labor Relations Act
included a similar duty of fair representation.I t
Although the initial duty of fair representation cases dealt with
union efforts to adopt and enforce racially discriminatory workplace
standards, the Court soon extended the duty to other situations. t2 The
Court set the standard for evaluating duty of fair representation claims
involving grievance handling in Vaca v. Sipes.t 3 In that case, an em-
ployer discharged a worker named Owens after the company doctor
judged that Owens's high blood pressure rendered him unfit for work.
The union represented Owens through the preliminary steps of the griev-
ance procedure. Under the collective bargaining agreement, employees
did not have a right to take grievances to arbitration on their own; the
decision to arbitrate a grievance had to be made by the union's executive
board. Before taking Owens's case to arbitration, the union sent him to
another doctor of Owens's choice at union expense. That doctor issued a
report supporting the company's position, and the union decided not to
arbitrate the matter. Owens filed a section 301 suit, claiming that the
doctors were wrong and that in any event he had a right to an arbitra-
tor's determination on the merits of his grievance. There was no allega-
tion or evidence of racial hostility or other personal animosity between
Owens and the union officials who decided not to take his grievance to
arbitration.
The Supreme Court held that Owens's claim was of a breach of the
duty of fair representation but that the evidence-which at most showed
that the determination of medical unfitness was incorrect and which
would not support a finding of bad faith or arbitrariness-failed to sus-
tain the claim:
A breach of the statutory duty of fair representation occurs only
when a union's conduct toward a member of the collective bargaining
unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith .... Some have sug-
gested that every individual employee should have the right to have his
grievance taken to arbitration. Others have urged that the union be
given substantial discretion ... to decide whether a grievance should
be taken to arbitration, subject only to the duty to refrain from pa-
11. Syres v. Oil Workers Int'l Union, Local No. 23, 350 U.S. 892 (1955), rev'g 223 F.2d 739
(5th Cir. 1955). In Syres, the Court, relying on Steele, summarily reversed a Fifth Circuit decision
that there was no duty of fair representation under the National Labor Relations Act. The case
involved racial allegations similar to those in Steele.
12. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 342 (1964) (allowing a union decision to
dovetail seniority rosters); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337-38 (1953) (allowing a
union's agreement to seniority credit for military veterans).
13. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
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tently wrongful conduct such as racial discrimination or personal
hostility.
Though we accept the proposition that a union may not arbitrar-
ily ignore a meritorious grievance or process it in a perfunctory fash-
ion, we do not agree that the individual has an absolute right to have
his grievance taken to arbitration regardless of the provisions of the
applicable collective bargaining agreement.
14
The Court went on to say that "[i]n a case such as this, when Owens
supplied the Union with medical evidence supporting his position, the
Union might well have breached its duty had it ignored Owens' com-
plaint or had it processed the grievance in a perfunctory manner."' 15
In deciding fair representation claims ever since, courts have in-
voked the litany "arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith," but there
has been substantial disagreement as to the meaning of those words.t 6 If
a union bases its collective-bargaining or grievance-handling decisions on
racial animosity, the status of the grievant in the union or his support of
the union leadership, personal hostility, or any other form of intentional
misconduct, it certainly has breached its statutory duty. But the
Supreme Court has not decided whether union carelessness or incompe-
tence, without malicious intent, violates the duty. Is negligent or incom-
petent advocacy (or negligent failure to pursue a grievance) what the
Court means by "perfunctory treatment"?
III. NEGLIGENT GRIEVANCE HANDLING IN THE
COURTS OF APPEALS
The courts of appeals have had to devise a more precise definition of
the duty of fair representation. They have been faced with a variety of
claims involving simple forgetfulness and carelessness in the more
mechanical aspects of grievance processing,1 7 failure to interview the
14. Id. at 190-91 (footnotes and citations omitted).
15. Id. at 194.
16. The Supreme Court has decided relatively few duty of fair representation cases since Vaca
and none have significantly expanded upon or clarified its standard. In Amalgamated Ass'n of
Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 299-301 (1971), the Court
in dicta implied that the Vaca standard required a showing of "fraud, deceitful action or dishonest
conduct" on the part of the union. Five years later, however, the Court ignored Lockridge and
reiterated that arbitrary or perfunctory handling of grievances violates the duty of fair representa-
tion. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 568-69 (1976). See also DelCostello v.
International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 164 (1983) (indicating that a union breaches the duty
of fair representation when it handles a grievance in a "discriminatory, dishonest, arbitrary or per-
functory fashion"); Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 459 U.S. 212, 222 (1983) (breach of the
duty of fair representation characterized as "wrongful union conduct").
17. See, e.g., Grafv. Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry., 697 F.2d 771 (7th Cir. 1983); Dutrisac v. Caterpil-
lar Tractor Co., 749 F.2d 1270, 1272 (9th Cir. 1983); Hoffman v. Lonza, Inc., 658 F.2d 519, 520 (7th
Cir. 1981); Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306, 310 (6th Cir. 1975).
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grievant or to investigate the facts of the grievance,' 8 and incompetent or
inadequate advocacy by a union representative at preliminary grievance
hearings or before an arbitrator,' 9 and they have handled these claims in
varied ways. Some courts-with the Sixth and Ninth Circuits leading
the way-have held that at least under some circumstances union negli-
gence does breach the statutory duty of fair representation while
others-particularly the Seventh Circuit-have flatly rejected that view.
It is useful to examine the contrasting approaches in some depth.
Perhaps the paradigmatic case of union negligence-and certainly a
good illustration of the Seventh Circuit's approach-is Graf v. Elgin, Jo-
liet & Eastern Ry.20 Graf was discharged for omitting a portion of his
employment history on his job application. 2' He filed a grievance, which
was denied at the initial level, and asked his union representative to ap-
peal. The union man agreed, filled out the appeal form, put it in his
pocket, and found it still there after the 60-day time period for filing
appeals had elapsed. 22 There was no evidence that the union representa-
tive was guilty of anything but carelessness; it seems that he simply mis-
placed and forgot about the appeal form. The Seventh Circuit held that
the carelessness of the union representative did not give rise to a claim of
breach of the duty of fair representation:
The standard is as follows. The union has a duty to represent
every worker in the bargaining unit fairly but it breaches that duty
only if it deliberately and unjustifiably refuses to represent the worker.
Negligence, even gross negligence... is not enough; and, obviously,
intentional misconduct may not be inferred from negligence, whether
simple or gross.... [The union representative] was not trying to do in
Graf; nor does his lapse of memory signify such a reckless indifference
to Graf's interests that it can be called intentional misconduct....
There is no evidence that [the union representative] was acting in bad
18. Such failures might result in the union not taking a meritorious case to arbitration because
of a mistaken evaluation of its merit, or in poor representation at grievance hearings or before an
arbitrator. See, e.g., Dober v. Roadway Express, Inc., 707 F.2d 292, 293-94 (7th Cir. 1983); Cote v.
Eagle Stores, Inc., 688 F.2d 32, 34 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1218 (1983).
19. See, e.g., Dober, 707 F.2d 292; Rupe v. Spector Freight Sys., Inc., 679 F.2d 685, 689-90, 692
(7th Cir. 1982); Cannon v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 524 F.2d 290, 293 (7th Cir. 1975);
Liotta v. National Forge Co., 473 F. Supp. 1139, 1144-45 (W.D. Pa. 1979), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part, 629 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 970 (1981); Holodnak v. Avco Corp., 381 F.
Supp. 191, 194 (D. Conn. 1974), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 514 F.2d 285 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 892 (1975).
20. 697 F.2d 771 (7th Cir. 1983).
21. Graf, who had been working for the railroad for two years, had sustained an injury on the
job. In investigating the injury the railroad learned that he had also been injured on a previous job
and had failed to report that injury or that previous job on his application. Id. at 773.
22. The appeal form was handwritten, as is apparently customary at that workplace. It stated:
"Please consider this as a appeal to your dission ... [terminating Gra. I can't except your dission
and therefore appeal to the next highest officer of the carrier. We ask that he be reinstated with




The court did not attempt to attribute this standard to any words of
the Supreme Court. To the contrary, it acknowledged that "[tihe proper
standard cannot be determined by parsing ambiguous dicta."' 24 Instead,
it rested on its conception of how unions operate, are staffed and main-
tain their status as exclusive representative:
A practical consideration in favor of a narrow standard of liability
is suggested by the text of the appeal drafted by Evans. Most of the
union officers who process grievances and commit the gaffes that pro-
pel the Grafs of this world into court are not professional advocates.
They are hourly workers "grieving" on a part-time basis. It would not
be realistic to try to hold them to the same standard as lawyers, who
are liable in damages if they fail to file their clients' appeals on time,
and yet Graf wants us to judge Evans' inaction by what amounts to a
concept of professional malpractice.
2 5
Although Graf involved an employment relation governed by the RLA,
rather than the Taft-Hartley Act, the Seventh Circuit has applied the
same standard and used the same reasoning in Taft-Hartley cases.
26
In another case-Dober v. Roadway Express, Inc. 27-the court made
clear the reason for its rigid distinction between unfair representation
and inadequate or incompetent representation: only in the former is in-
tervention required. "[Workers] do not need our protection against rep-
resentation that is inept but not invidious. If a local union does an
incompetent job of grieving, its members can vote in new officers who
will do a better job or they can vote in another union."'28 An individual
employee or a minority group of employees suffering intentionally dis-
criminatory treatment would have little power to oust the union. In fact,
the unfair treatment of these employees may bolster the union's support
among the majority of employees. But negligence or incompetence-
randomly distributed-is likely to be of concern to everyone and the em-
ployees in the bargaining unit can be expected to force change (either of
the union's grievance handlers and officers or of the union itself) when
the level of service falls below their minimum standard.
The Seventh Circuit's approach in Graf may be contrasted with that
23. Id. at 778-79. This was the court's statement of its duty of fair representation standard
under the general federal labor laws. The court went on to hold that the standard also applies to
cases under the Railway Labor Act.
24. Id. at 778.
25. Id. at 779.
26. See, e.g., Camacho v. Ritz-Carlton Water Tower, 786 F.2d 242 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 106
S. Ct. 3282 (1986); Dober, 707 F.2d 292; Hoffman, 658 F.2d 519.
27. 707 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1983).
28. Id. at 295.
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of the Ninth Circuit in Dutrisac v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. 29 and the Sixth
Circuit in Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp. 30 In Dutrisac, Caterpillar
Tractor Company fired Bill Gamble allegedly for excessive absenteeism,
but he claimed the discharge was racially motivated and filed a grievance.
Caterpillar denied the grievance at the preliminary steps and the union
decided to take the case to arbitration. But the union representative
made a mistake in calculating the date on which the formal request for
arbitration was due, and he filed it two weeks late. The arbitrator dis-
missed the grievance as untimely. Gamble then sued the union, claiming
that its mishandling of the grievance breached the duty of fair representa-
tion. The court of appeals upheld the claim, even though it specifically
acknowledged that there was no evidence of intentional misconduct.
3 1
Although the court noted that the union should be given wide discretion
in matters involving judgment-for example, in evaluating the merits of
a grievance-it found that "no purpose" would be served by allowing the
employee's rights to be determined by the union's negligent "failure to
perform ministerial acts."
' 32
R uzicka involved similar facts. General Motors fired William Ru-
zicka for being intoxicated on the job and for verbally abusing his super-
visor. Ruzicka did not deny his actions or contest their impropriety, but
he filed a timely grievance claiming that the penalty was unduly harsh.
The company denied the grievance at the preliminary steps, and the
union filed the notice required to invoke arbitration. But the collective
bargaining agreement also required the union to file a detailed statement
of the grievance; the union, without explanation, failed to file the state-
ment, and the grievance expired. Ruzicka sued the union, claiming a
violation of the duty of fair representation. The district court dismissed
the suit, holding that mere neglect, rather than intentionally hostile inac-
tion, was insufficient to establish a duty of fair representation claim. The
court of appeals reversed, holding that the union's "negligent and per-
functory handling" of Ruzicka's grievance constituted unfair
representation. 33
Neither the Ruzicka nor the Dutrisac court addressed the arguments
29. 749 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1983).
30. 523 F.2d 306 (6th Cir. 1975).
31. 749 F.2d at 1272.
32. Id. at 1274. The court's decision was not without limits: "[W]e limit our holding that
union negligence may breach the duty of fair representation to cases in which the individual interest
at stake is strong and the union's failure to perform a ministerial act completely extinguishes the
employee's right to pursue his claim." Id.
33. 523 F.2d at 310. The same approach was taken by the First Circuit in De Arroyo v. Sindi-
cato De Trabajadores Packing House, 425 F.2d 281, 284 (lst Cir. 1970).
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made in Graf and other Seventh Circuit opinions. Ruzicka relied primar-
ily on the ambiguous dicta of Vaca v. Sipes, and Dutrisac simply saw no
purpose in insulating unions from liability for their negligence and as-
serted that the threat of liability would promote greater care.
34
IV. SHOULD NEGLIGENT GRIEVANCE HANDLING BE INCLUDED
WITHIN THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION?
This, of course, brings us to the point where we must ask which of
the two divergent views should carry the day. There are two strong ar-
guments which have been made in favor of including union negligence
within the duty of fair representation, but neither seems entirely persua-
sive. First of all, as Professors Harper and Lupu point out, the explana-
tion of pure negligence ("I forgot" or "I miscalculated the filing date and
was late") may be an easy disguise for hostility. After intentionally fail-
ing to file an arbitration demand in a timely manner because the grievant
was on the outs with the leadership or his cause was unpopular, a union
defending a duty of fair representation lawsuit would be unlikely to ad-
mit its improper motive, but much more likely--especially in the Seventh
Circuit-to claim inadvertent error. "We decided not to take the case to
arbitration" becomes all too easily "we forgot" or "we misplaced the
34. Scholars have been as divided as the courts of appeals. Several have attempted to fashion
comprehensive models to handle all fair representation cases, and they have often differed on and
had difficulty with cases involving negligent grievance handling. See, e.g., Cheit, Competing Models
of Fair Representation: The Perfunctory Processing Cases, 24 B.C.L. REV. 1 (1982); Clark, The Duty
of Fair Representation: A Theoretical Structure, 51 TEX. L. REV. 1119 (1973); Finkin, The Limits of
Majority Rule in Collective Bargaining, 64 MINN. L. REV. 183 (1980); Harper & Lupu, Fair Repre-
sentation as Equal Protection, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1211 (1985); Summers, The Individual Employee's
Rights Under the Collective Agreement: What Constitutes Fair Representation?, 126 U. PA. L. REV.
251 (1977); VanderVelde, A Fair Process Model for the Union's Fair Representation Duty, 67 MINN.
L. REV. 1079 (1983).
Under some of the models, negligent grievance handling would generally breach the duty of fair
representation. See Cheit, Summers and VanderVelde, supra. In others it would not. See Harper &
Lupu, supra. Perhaps the most ingenious means of fitting negligence cases into a model that would
otherwise seem to exclude them was that devised by Professors Harper and Lupu. Their equal
protection model of fair representation rejects any "duty-of-care norm" for union grievance han-
dling, but accommodates cases of carelessness and serious neglect by in effect assuming that pure
negligence never occurs. Their model includes "an irrebuttable presumption that the use of unrea-
soned negligence as a justification for departing from [a union's] usual grievance handling processing
standards hides an improper motive" and therefore breaches the duty of fair representation. Harper
& Lupu, supra, at 1275. One must ask why, under their equal protection model, this presumption
must be irrebuttable, unless they are merely unwilling to adhere to a model which would rule out
liability for negligence. Suppose, for example, that a union shop steward was handling a grievance
for an employee who just happens to be his neighbor, his best friend, and his brother-in-law, all in
one. He carefully fills out the form demanding arbitration, checks all the details with the grievant,
places it on top of the pile in his briefcase to be filed the next morning (the deadline date), but then in
the press of an unexpectedly busy day at work (or because he is distracted by his wife's illness or his
son's destruction of the family automobile) he simply forgets to turn in the form. Under such cir-
cumstances, what justification is there for an "irrebuttable presumption [ofl improper motive"?
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form" or "we inadvertently filed it too late." The Seventh Circuit's rule
is almost certain to shelter some intentional misconduct.
This criticism at most warrants a refinement of the intentional mis-
conduct rule, not its abandonment. Even in the Seventh Circuit a trial
court should be free, upon hearing evidence that the allegedly negligent
union conduct was toward a disfavored employee or in regard to a disfa-
vored cause, to make a determination that the action was not negligent at
all, but was instead intentional, improper conduct. The court would be
required to make the kind of credibility determination trial courts often
have to make and should consider both the evidence of the grievant's
unpopularity (or that of his cause) and evidence of the likelihood that the
union's conduct was inadvertent in light of the union's grievance-han-
dling record and its procedures. There seems no need for any irrebut-
table presumption of improper conduct in such cases, but neither is there
any good reason to prohibit the court from making a credibility determi-
nation against the union.
The second argument in favor of including union negligence within
the duty of fair representation is that the contrary rule leads to overly
harsh results, especially in discharge cases. When an employee is termi-
nated in breach of his contractual rights and fails to win reinstatement
solely because the union failed to protect those rights in a careful and
competent manner, should he be left without any recourse?35 Stated this
way, the argument is weak. The duty of fair representation clearly does
not protect employees against unjust dismissals or other harsh outcomes.
The duty sets no minimum level of procedural protection or representa-
tional service; it does not require unions to play any part in the grievance
process or to negotiate for any procedural protection for dismissals. A
union may negotiate a collective bargaining agreement allowing an em-
ployer complete discretion in matters of hiring, firing, promotion, job
assignment and so forth.36 The union may decide that the employees it
35. Some may argue that this is unlikely ever to happen, because if an employee can truly
demonstrate that his discharge was improper, his employer will reinstate him without the assistance
of the union. But even in a case of plain employer error (e.g., firing the wrong "John Smith" or
discharging an employee for some misconduct that is later proven to have been committed by some-
one else), will an employer not only reinstate the wronged employee but also pay him for the time
away from the job? More importantly, most cases of wrongful discharge are not so simple. Arbitra-
tors often find that a discharge is wrongful and order reinstatement not because of such glaring
employer errors, but because the employer failed to follow the required procedures, did not use
"progressive discipline," or imposed too harsh a penalty for the offense. In such cases, it seems
highly unlikely that an employer would reverse itself voluntarily. See F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI,
How ARBITRATION WORKS 650-707 (4th ed. 1985); R. FLEMING, THE LABOR ARBITRATION PRO-
CESS 136-40 (1965).
36. Or a union might negotiate a collective bargaining agreement which provides that employ-
ees cannot be dismissed except for just cause, but that provides either no mechanism for enforcing
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represents are better off giving the employer that discretion in return for
better pay, benefits or working conditions. An employee "unjustly" dis-
charged who is covered by such an agreement could complain of no vio-
lation and would have no remedy arising from the federal labor law or
the terms of the agreement. That, too, is a harsh result, but not one that
breaches the statutory duty of fair representation.
But the argument can be stated in a stronger way: of course unions
need not negotiate any substantive or procedural protection against un-
just discharges or other unfair employer action, but when they do negoti-
ate substantive rights that could ordinarily be enforced by individual
employee suits under section 301, and then agree to exclusive contractual
remedies that both preclude section 301 suits and give the union (rather
than the employee) control over the employee's grievance, then the union
is obligated to exercise care and competence in handling the matter for
the employee.
3 7
There are several faults with the argument stated this way, as well.
To begin with, because it is dependent upon the existence of a certain
contractual arrangement (substantive rights coupled with exclusive
union control of the remedial procedure) which may vary greatly from
contract to contract, it seems more an argument about the contractual
obligations of unions rather than their statutory obligations. In effect, it
assumes an additional contractual clause, one that requires the union to
exercise a certain degree of care when it has exclusive control, but it
makes that assumption without regard to contractual evidence. More
importantly, whether we consider the obligation of care and competence
to arise out of contract or out of the statute, it is not at all clear that it is
an obligation that should be imposed on every union. It is not self-evi-
dent that whenever a union negotiates for exclusive control over the
grievance process (or at least over arbitration) the employees would be
willing to pay for the highest degree of care. Care is not cost free; it costs
much more to have lawyers handle grievances than to have full-time paid
that right or even a final and binding mechanism pursuant to which the decision in the end is left
completely in the hands of the employer. Such a grievance procedure might provide, for example,
that discharged employees have a right to appeal the decision through several layers of upper man-
agement, with or without union representation, but that the management decision at the highest
level is final and binding. Union agreement to such provisions would not violate the duty of fair
representation, even though they might result in unjustly discharged employees having no recourse.
37. This argument may be analogized to due process: even though the government is not re-
quired to provide specific substantive entitlements, once it does so the courts have a constitutional
duty to oversee that the distribution of those entitlements is done in a fair and careful way. The
courts have rejected the argument that recipients must accept arbitrary or perfunctory procedural
protection if that is all that is provided with the discretionary entitlement. But of course collective
bargaining relationships are private, not governmental ones, and it is clear that private agreements
can provide substantive benefits without any procedural protections whatsoever.
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union grievance handlers, and it costs more to have full-time, paid griev-
ance handlers than to rely upon part-time, perhaps even unpaid, union
officers. Training, record-keeping and supervision all have costs, and it is
not at all certain merely because the union has assumed exclusive control
that the workers wish it to incur (and to pass on in the form of dues
increases) all of those costs. For example, a union might estimate that if
it hired a professional to handle grievances, or assigned a full-time cleri-
cal employee to keep track of the progress of grievances it could prevent
the negligent loss of only one or two grievances during the term of a
three-year collective bargaining agreement. The union must then deter-
mine whether that improvement justified the cost, and there seems to be
no persuasive reason why it should be subject to liability when it decides
in good faith (and perhaps even correctly) that the improvement is not
worth the cost.
In addition, the argument looks at one piece of an integrated pack-
age in isolation, assuming that employers do not take into account the
means of enforcement when they agree to substantive rights. It may very
well be incorrect to assume that if the union did not acquire exclusive
control over the grievance process, the employer would still agree to the
same substantive rights. It thus may be incorrect to assume that were it
not for the union's exclusive control, the employees would have and
would be able to enforce these rights on their own through arbitration or
section 301 suits. Employers agree to substantive rights with the knowl-
edge that the union will exercise a screening and mediating function and
knowing that expensive litigation is quite unlikely. It is not at all certain
that they would agree to the same employee rights without union control
over the grievance procedure, so it is inappropriate to look at the situa-
tion as one in which the union prevents the employees from enforcing
rights they would have and be able to enforce absent union control.
This brings us to the two primary arguments against including
union negligence and incompetence within the statutory duty of fair rep-
resentation.3 First of all, neither the analytical underpinnings support-
38. The Seventh Circuit decisions contain two other arguments against including union negli-
gence within the duty of fair representation: 1) such a rule would embroil courts in employment
relations and would be contrary to the national policy favoring voluntary resolution of employment
relations disputes through arbitration (see, e.g., Camacho, 786 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1986); Dober, 707
F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1983)); and 2) unions might be willing to falsely claim negligence and thus assist
workers in obtaining a remedy against the employer (see, e.g., Camacho, 786 F.2d 242; Hoffman, 658
F.2d 519 (1981)).
Neither of these arguments seems persuasive. The first would argue against recognizing any
duty of fair representation, and does not tell us why a negligence standard would be inappropriate
while an intentional misconduct standard would be appropriate. Moreover, in many of the negli-
gence cases the union's conduct has prevented the dispute from ever being decided by an arbitrator.
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ing the duty of fair representation nor anything else in the federal labor
statute support the imposition of a duty of care and competence. The
duty of fair representation developed as a corollary of the statutory con-
cept of exclusive representation. As the Court held in Steele v. Louisville
& Nashville R.R. ,39 Congress conferred upon unions the authority to bar-
gain on behalf of all employees in a bargaining unit, including those em-
ployees who opposed the union or who belonged to groups or held ideas
found repugnant by the majority of the workers or by the dominant fac-
tion. That authority carries with it an obligation to "exercise fairly the
power... in behalf of all those for whom [the union] acts, without hos-
tile discrimination against [any of] them." 4 The gravamen of the duty of
fair representation is thus fairness, or the absence of hostile discrimina-
tion against disfavored individuals or groups.
This notion of fairness does not encompass an obligation to supply
any particular level of care or competence. A union may be careless
without being discriminatory, and it may be incompetent without being
unfair or having any hostile motivation. If the carelessness or incompe-
tence is uniform or random, it does not raise the concerns of abuse of
power that underlie Steele and the later fair representation decisions.
When a union forgets or loses a grievance form or bungles its presenta-
tion before an arbitrator, it is not twisting its statutory authority to serve
impermissible ends, it is merely demonstrating (perhaps excessive)
human failings.
If a duty of care and competence is not included in the duty of fair-
ness implied by the power of exclusive representation, it is certainly not
found in any other part of the federal labor statute. None of the union
unfair labor practices found in section 8(b) of Taft-Hartley 41 can be
stretched to require a union to do its job well, nor can such an obligation
See, e.g., United States Postal Serv. v. Bowen, 459 U.S. 212 (1983); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171
(1967); Graf v. Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry., 697 F.2d 771 (7th Cir. 1983); Hoffman v. Lonza, Inc., 658
F.2d 519 (7th Cir. 1981). The court would not be second-guessing an arbitral decision and in some
cases may even have the authority to order arbitration to take place.
The second argument carried more weight before the Supreme Court decided Bowen. Although
acknowledging negligence (especially by an elected organization with elected officers) always has
costs, before Bowen those costs were limited. But in that case the Supreme Court held that a union is
liable for that portion of the backpay liability accruing after the date on which the employee would
have received his arbitral remedy had the union not breached its statutory duty. Considering the
likely delay between the discharge and even the initial trial court decision in fair representation
cases, the financial liability of the union is likely to be great, perhaps even greater than that of the
employer. Unions are thus likely to have a powerful incentive to disprove any allegation that they
breached the duty of fair representation.
39. 323 U.S. at 202-03.
40. Id.
41. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1982).
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be found elsewhere. In fact, as the Seventh Circuit has noted, the elec-
tion machinery of section 9 of Taft-Hartley 2 and the democratic safe-
guards of the Landrum-Griffin Act43 imply that Congress believed that
the best way to ensure that employees remain satisfied with the perform-
ance of their union was to give them full freedom to participate in union
governance and, when the need arises, to remove or replace the union.
The second argument against including union negligence or incom-
petence within the duty of fair representation reflects the necessary and
desirable variation among unions. Unions vary greatly in size, sophisti-
cation and resources. Some are in-house organizations representing the
employees of but one small employer, having no paid staff of their own
and charging insignificant dues. Others represent millions of people who
work for thousands of employers in the United States and other coun-
tries, have hundreds of full-time paid union employees including a staff of
lawyers, and charge each represented employee annual dues of several
hundred or even a few thousand dollars. Most fall somewhere between
these two extremes. The federal labor laws give employees the right to
choose their own representatives for collective bargaining purposes, and
this includes the right to choose a union with a grievance-handling
budget so low that it cannot possibly meet the standard of care and com-
petence expected of a lawyer or a professional business agent. Workers
may choose a lower standard of representation in order to save money, to
use its resources elsewhere (e.g., on a strike fund or on insurance benefits
for workers or retirees), or they may simply believe that in the long run
an aggressive, legalistic approach to grievances will sour the relationship
between the employees and their employer and would not be worth it for
that reason. 44
A uniform statutory duty of fair representation which included a
42. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1982).
43. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, as amended 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-
531 (1982).
44. In making this argument, the Seventh Circuit has sometimes stated that we should not be
overly concerned with a union's representation because if the workers do not like it they can select a
different union or at least replace the officers in charge of grievance handling. See Camacho, 786
F.2d at 245 ("the casual handling of grievances may not be what the employees want, but if perfunc-
tory representation defeats rather than implements the wishes of the employees, they may install a
new team of grievers"); Dober, 707 F.2d at 295 ("If a local union does an incompetent job of griev-
ing, its members can vote in new officers who will do a better job or they can vote in another
union."). But as the court in Dober acknowledged, this argument-which can be made in all duty of
fair representation cases-should not be taken too far. The right to vote for a different union or new
officers is no comfort to members of a minority faction within the union whose interests the union
has intentionally neglected. They are the very ones the duty of fair representation must protect, and
their votes may never be sufficient to bring about change. The argument makes sense in the context
of truly negligent conduct, but its logic would be flawed if applied to cases of intentional misconduct.
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minimum duty of care and competence in grievance handling would limit
the right of workers to choose a union which did not meet that mini-
mum. Of course it is probably correct that workers never say that they
want a careless and incompetent (but cheap) union, but they do resist
dues increases, they do favor unions that are less costly over others that
charge more, they do want their unions to do other things with their dues
money than just represent grievants, and they do try to avoid excessive
confrontation. A statutory duty of minimum care and competence
would limit the options of the unions (and union officers) democratically
chosen by the workers to use limited resources as they see fit, and in
some cases it might force unions to spend more time and money on griev-
ance handling than the workers want to spend. It may at times seem
harsh that a worker might lose her job or another valid claim against her
employer merely because the majority of employees in her union have
chosen not to pay for the highest level of grievance handling competence.
But, under the system of exclusive representation, lots of decisions will be
made by or on behalf of the majority that might disadvantage others.
That is inherent in exclusive representation, and is not unfair unless the
disadvantages are distributed in some intentionally unfair way.
Because the duty of fair representation sets a statutory minimum, a
duty of care and competence would apply to the smallest and the poorest
unions as well as to the largest and the wealthiest; it might even have the
effect of putting some unions out of business or at least making it impos-
sible for them to agree to grievance procedures that include any substan-
tial representational role for the union. And because an employer may
very well be more reluctant to grant substantive rights if it knows that
those rights can be enforced by individual employees through time-con-
suming and expensive litigation, the inability of the union to assume a
screening role in the grievance process might result in reduced substan-
tive rights for employees.
V. THE CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS OF UNIONS
IN GRIEVANCE HANDLING
The reason courts have had great difficulty devising rules or models
to accommodate both the kinds of discrimination and intentional mis-
conduct that the duty of fair representation was originally created to
handle and cases of union carelessness or incompetence is that they have
been trying to fit two conceptually distinct causes of action into one
model. The duty of fair representation was established as a statutory
duty establishing minimum standards to be applied to all unions. When
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a court establishes a rule that certain union conduct violates the duty of
fair representation, it is establishing a standard of conduct for all unions.
Representation which might seem inadequate on the part of a sophisti-
cated and well-financed union with a large legal staff may fall well within
the expected norm for a single-company, poorly-financed union with no
paid union employees. The statutory duty is seen as one that must set a
uniform, minimum standard of fairness that can be met by all fair and
responsible unions, including those with very limited resources; it cannot
prohibit the "inadequate" representation of the well-endowed union if to
do so would also prohibit the adequate representation of a union with
fewer resources.
The uniformity expected of a statutory standard need not apply to
contractual obligations, however. As an example in a wholly different
context, the law imposes a statutory duty on companies engaged in min-
ing to observe certain minimum safety standards, which are uniform
throughout the industry. But there is no reason why such companies
cannot assume contractual duties to observe more rigid standards, nor
any reason why such greater contractual duties cannot be enforced in
court. Similarly, unions may, as part of their contractual obligations to-
ward workers, assume duties of representational care, competence and
service above and beyond that imposed by the statutory duty of fair rep-
resentation. For example, it is well-established that the statutory duty of
fair representation does not require unions to take every discharge case to
arbitration, 45 but there is absolutely no reason why a union could not
contract with workers to do so. And even if-as the Seventh Circuit
holds-the duty of fair representation does not cover union negligence,
there is no reason why a union could not agree to compensate employees
for economic harm caused by the union's negligence. Because such obli-
gations are derived from contractual arrangements that vary considera-
bly from union to union and even from workplace to workplace
represented by the same union, the obligations themselves vary greatly.
One might expect the contractual obligations of a sophisticated, well-
financed international union to exceed those of a poorly-financed union
representing the employees of one small company, but such generaliza-
tions will not always hold true, and contractual obligations (unlike statu-
tory duties) must be assessed on a contract-by-contract basis.
It seems to me that the proper way to consider claims against a
union for negligent grievance handling is the same way claims against
other agents are handled: as possible breaches of express or implied con-
45. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 191.
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tractual obligations. The performance of unions should not be evaluated
in accordance with some abstract standard of minimum care, but should
be considered on a case-by-case basis in accordance with the care, com-
petence and services the union has agreed to supply.
Suppose two unions were competing for the same group of employ-
ees, the very kind of competition the Seventh Circuit's decisions assume
will occur. Union A, the incumbent, charges that if it were turned out in
favor of Union B, the employees would incur much higher dues obliga-
tions. Union B responds by admitting that its dues are substantially
higher, but that this is more than made up for by the services the union
provides. The union statement emphasizes the services it provides to dis-
charged workers: "Unlike Union A, under the terms of our union consti-
tution whenever an employee files a grievance protesting his discharge,
we will take the case to arbitration and we will supply an experienced
labor lawyer who will exercise the highest degree of care and professional
competence in representing the employee before the arbitrator." Union
B wins the election, employee Smith subsequently gets discharged and
files a grievance, and the union assigns to the case a lay grievance handler
(rather than a lawyer) and he proceeds to bungle the case, failing to in-
vestigate the matter and filing the demand for arbitration too late.
Under such (admittedly extreme) circumstances, there is no reason
why Smith should not be able to sue the union for breach of its obligation
to supply a competent lawyer. More importantly, there is no reason why
a union should not be liable for contract damages under less extreme
circumstances, where the collective bargaining agreement, the union con-
stitution and by-laws, oral representations by the union, or the prior
course of dealing between the union and represented workers gives rise to
a contractual obligation to provide particular services at a particular
level of care and competence. As in many contract cases, it will often be
difficult to establish exactly what contractual obligations a union has in-
curred, but once that is done, contract damages should be available for
breach.
46
Of course, in deciding claims that negligent or incompetent griev-
ance handling by unions violates contractual duties, courts will have to
decide what the background rule should be. In particular, should a col-
lective bargaining agreement under which the union assumes exclusive
control over the entire grievance procedure (or at least over the final
46. Both the difficulty, and in the end the possibility, of establishing what contractual obliga-
tions a union has incurred can be analogized to the surmountable difficulty of determining the terms
of implied employment contracts in wrongful discharge cases.
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step) be construed to include a contractual obligation of care and compe-
tence unless the parties specify to the contrary, or should it be inter-
preted to include such a duty only if it is specifically set out in the
agreement? There are powerful arguments for each side. On the side
against including a duty of care and competence (unless provided for) is
the argument that contractual obligations are voluntary and should not
be inferred absent some indication in the agreement, especially where, as
here, it would not be so difficult to draft contract language to cover the
issue and it is not something so rare that the parties would not think of
including it if they wanted to do so. On the other side is the argument
that, as between the union and individual employees, the union is in the
best position to prevent the loss (Le., to avoid negligence or incompe-
tence) and to insure against the loss. 47 Similarly, there is the argument
that when the terms of a contract are in doubt, the doubt should be re-
solved against the party that drafted or negotiated the contract and was
in the better position to achieve favorable contract language if it wanted
that language (i.e., as between the union and individual employees, the
union).48 Although I favor the latter side of the argument, and would
include a contractual duty of care and competence unless specifically ex-
cluded, it seems less important to decide what the background rule
should be than it is to identify the need for such a rule.
VI. ENFORCEMENT OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS OF UNIONS
Saying that claims of union negligence or incompetence are concep-
tually distinct from the kinds of unfairness claims usually considered
under the duty of fair representation and should be treated as contract
claims does not answer the question of how and where such claims
should be enforced. There seems to be at least three possibilities. First,
the duty of fair representation could be expanded to include this concep-
tually distinct category of claims, requiring a two-part test.49 Second,
because the union's representational role is expressly established in the
collective bargaining agreement, the claims could be considered as sec-
tion 301 suits alleging violation of the collective agreements. Third, the
47. For an analysis of contracts as insurance and allocation of contractual risks in the absence
of clear contract language, see R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 4.5 (3d ed. 1986).
48. Another way of putting it is that, as between the union and individual employees, the trans-
action cost of getting favorable language would be less for the union, so it should be required to pay
that cost if it wants the favorable rule.
49. The first part of the test would examine whether the employee's treatment involved inten-
tional misconduct, and the second part-reached only if the first is failed-would examine whether
the union's conduct breached its contractual obligation of competence and care.
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claims could be considered as independent contract claims under state
law.
The first possibility, implicitly rejected by the Seventh Circuit, suf-
fers several faults. The duty of fair representation is a statutory duty
established by Congress; it would seem most unusual to determine the
scope of that duty by examining the intent of the parties to a particular
collective bargaining agreement. Moreover, Congress and the courts
have made it abundantly clear over the years that breaches of the obliga-
tions established by collective bargaining agreements are not unfair labor
practices or violations of the labor laws.50 Congress has decided that
such breaches are best left to the contractual remedies included in the
agreement, and there seems no reason to treat these contractual claims
differently. The traditional deference of courts to labor arbitrators re-
flects this congressional decision, and the fact that violations of the duty
of fair representation are considered unfair labor practices, 5' while
breaches of collective bargaining agreements are not, is further evidence
that it would be inappropriate to incorporate essentially contractual
claims within the duty of fair representation. The duty of fair representa-
tion began as a minimum standard of protection against unfair-inten-
tionally discriminatory-treatment, and it should remain that. There
seems no good reason to try to consider contractual obligations, which
must be determined on a case-by-case basis, in the same framework as a
uniform statutory duty. To do so simply confuses both claims.
The second possibility-considering these claims as section 301
claims-offers many advantages, but it is not clear under existing prece-
dent whether federal courts would have jurisdiction over such claims
under section 301. Certainly a suit claiming that a union was negligent
or incompetent in carrying out its representational role is in part a suit
under the collective bargaining agreement. After all, it is the collective
agreement that establishes the representational role, and an employee
making a claim would first have to establish the union's role (under the
agreement) before he could even attempt to establish a contractual duty
of care and competence in fulfilling that role. Moreover, the federal pol-
icy concerns that led to the establishment of a uniform federal common
law governing the interpretation of collective bargaining agreements in
50. See Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 513 (1962). Of course, conduct
which breaches a collective bargaining agreement may independently violate the labor laws and
constitute an unfair labor practice, but not because of the contract breach alone. See Smith v.
Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 197 (1962).
51. Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied on other grounds, 326 F.2d
172 (2d Cir. 1963).
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section 301 suits would apply to suits claiming union negligence and in-
competence as well.52 Certainly federal labor policy would be ill-served
if the obligations of unions (including the background rules for contract
interpretation) would be determined by biased state courts (with the bias
in some courts in favor of unions and in other courts against unions). 53
In addition, thirty years after the Supreme Court's Lincoln Mills deci-
sion, a substantial body of uniform federal labor law has been fashioned
which would be of great use in deciding these claims. In particular, it
would be important to refer to the federal law governing section 301 suits
to ensure that the resolution of claims against unions does not contravene
federal laws or policies.5
4
Federal labor policy might best be served by considering these suits
against unions under section 301, and it can certainly be said that the
suits will also involve at least in part obligations contained in collective
bargaining agreements which are ordinarily enforceable under section
301. However, the suits in many cases will involve claims that are not
firmly grounded in collective bargaining agreements. For example, an
employee might claim that the union constitution or by-laws obligate it
to exercise care and competence in handling grievances, or he might as-
sert that oral representations (perhaps made during organizational cam-
paigns) form the foundation for the obligations, or even that the union's
prior course of dealings with employees give rise to the obligation. Simi-
lar claims of implied contractual duties are not unfamiliar to the law of
contracts or commercial transactions, but it is not clear that they can be
entertained in section 301 suits which by statutory definition must allege
"violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization...
or between any such labor organizations." 55 The Supreme Court re-
cently held, in a suit between a local union and its parent international
union, that the international's constitution was a section 301 contract,
but it specifically reserved the question of whether individual union
members could bring section 301 suits alleging violations of union con-
52. The Supreme Court held that courts must apply a federal common law to govern § 301
suits, and that such law must be fashioned from the policy of the federal labor laws. Textile Workers
v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957).
53. The concern here is not that state courts are more likely to be biased than federal courts; to
the contrary, § 301 suits may be heard in either state or federal courts. Charles Dowd Box Co., 368
U.S. at 491. The concern is that any bias which may exist be tempered by a uniform body of federal
law.
54. For example, it would conflict with federal law if a state court construed the role of unions
in grievance handling to require unions to take every asserted case to arbitration. See Vaca v. Sipes,
386 U.S. at 191.
55. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982).
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tracts.56 And, in Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, the Supreme
Court implied that federal courts would not have jurisdiction under sec-
tion 301 to enforce "union employee contracts that are said to be implied
at law" and that are not "governed by the terms of the collective bargain-
ing agreement itself."'5
7
A holding that employees could not use section 301 to enforce con-
tractual obligations found elsewhere than in collective bargaining agree-
ments seems to rest on an excessively narrow view of section 301 and also
seems to contravene the federal policies expressed in Lincoln Mills and
later cases in favor of uniform federal treatment of most collective bar-
gaining disputes. Particularly when the union's obligations rest at least
in part on the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, federal labor
policy would best be served by allowing their enforcement under section
301. But if federal courts take the contrary view, state suits (following
state law rather than uniform federal law) would be able to fill the void,
and the cases could be considered as independent contract actions under
state law.
Of course unions may set up their own grievance procedure, perhaps
culminating in arbitration, to resolve claims brought against them.5 8 Un-
ions may also seek contractual commitments from employers to indem-
nify the unions for all or part of their liability. Employers have an
interest in avoiding unnecessary arbitrations, and they therefore have an
interest in having unions screen out claims they see as unlikely to suc-
ceed. Because unions facing contractual liability for negligent grievance
handling may be reluctant to call close cases against grievants (i.e., to
decide not to go to arbitration and thus risk contract suits), employers
may find it in their interest to wholly or partially indemnify unions to
ensure that they will call those close cases as they see them.
It might be argued that this way of proceeding would be unsatisfac-
tory because employees unjustly discharged want their jobs back, and
that remedy would be unavailable in a contract suit against the union.
That is certainly correct, but it is no different from the situations faced by
clients who sue their lawyers for malpractice or other principals who sue
their agents for breach of their contractual obligations. In most cases,
the malpractice of one's lawyer provides only a cause of action against
56. Plumbers & Pipefitters v. Local 334, Plumbers & Pipefitters, 452 U.S. 615, 626-27 n.16
(1981). It is hard to understand how the Court could ever decide that even though union constitu-
tions are § 301 contracts, and employees are generally permitted to sue under § 301 for violations of
contracts, they could not sue for violation of union constitutions.
57. 403 U.S. 274, 300-01 (1971).
58. See generally Clayton v. International Union, UAW, 451 U.S. 679 (1981).
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the lawyer, not any right of recovery against a third party or a right to
have a judgment set aside. The interest in finality is seen as outweighing
the client's interest in a complete recovery. The same can be said in the
context of employment discharge cases. Moreover, this is another area
where one might expect to see employers enter into contractual obliga-
tions to rehire workers, because the cost to an employer of rehiring dis-
charged workers might very well be substantially less than the cost to the
union of paying damages for lost jobs.
I must emphasize that courts must not lightly infer that unions have
assumed contractual obligations to supply the highest level of grievance
handling care and service. As in all cases, such contractual obligations
arise voluntarily, when the union has agreed to supply a certain level of
services and care in return for the votes or the dues of the employees.
Most unions agree to supply only lay grievance handlers in most cases,
and although these grievance handlers take their task seriously and by
and large do a competent job, they cannot be held to the high standard of
lawyers or professional agents. A certain amount of inadvertent error is
bound to occur, and ordinarily it would not violate the contractual un-
derstanding. Mistakes will occasionally occur, even when the union's ac-
tions meet the contractual standard of care. However, if the union does
not supply the contractually required level of services or meet express or
implied contractual standards of care and competence, and the grievant
suffers a loss attributable to the union's breach (e.g., a discharged em-
ployee fails to win reinstatement when he would have, had the union
fulfilled its obligations), then the union should be liable to the employee
for contract damages. If the duty of fair representation is to be kept to its
proper limits in order to allow the market to function with competing
unions promising a variety of services in return for varying levels of dues,
then unions should be held accountable for the services and the care they
agree to provide.
CONCLUSION
The statutory duty of fair representation is just that: a duty to rep-
resent workers fairly. It is not an insurance policy against honest union
error, nor a safety valve to correct the occasional misfunction of the arbi-
tration system. As the Seventh Circuit has repeatedly held, the duty of
fair representation performs the important, but limited, function of pro-
tecting workers from intentional union misconduct. Such misconduct is
prohibited of all unions, large and small, rich and poor, sophisticated and
unsophisticated.
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The problem with trying to apply the statutory duty of fair represen-
tation to inadvertent union error is that such error cannot be considered
in the abstract, and no uniform rule will come close to handling all situa-
tions properly. Whether a union's error should be considered unaccept-
able depends on the degree of care, competence and perfection expected
of that union, and that will vary from case to case and from union to
union depending upon what the union has undertaken to do and what
standard it has promised to meet. By considering questions of union er-
ror and negligence as contractual issues, wholly apart from the statutory
duty of fair representation, courts will avoid the dilemma they now face
when they have to choose between setting a statutory standard all unions
can reasonably meet and leaving victims of unusual incompetence and
negligence without a remedy.
